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Abstract
After the opening reform of China, the revival of 
Chinese traditional culture has raised by the CCP. One 
characteristic of this revival has emerged with the 
continuous adaption of the Chinese classics in speeches 
of top leaders of the CCP . In particular, the current 
president Xi Jinping likes to cite Chinese traditional 
classics more than his two predecessors. This paper 
examines this tendency. At the same time, the CCP 
propaganda department also actively matches up Xi’s 
citation. They have published official interpretation 
books, raised Xi’s personal prestige as a Confucian 
gentleman possessing the good values of Chinese 
traditional philosophy. These values are aimed at 
gaining the support of the conservative climate in 
Chinese society and adapted to be an alternative for 
the reinforcement of CCP legitimacy. This paper also 
examines some concrete governmental policies of raising 
this adaption and observes that Xi and the CCP have 
begun to use it to connect with current social problems 
and their solutions in China, such as officials’ morality, 
social justice and equality, rule by law and nationalism. 
However, Xi has not matched this perfect commitment 
in reality.
Key words: CCP leaders; Chinese classics; Regime 
legitimacy; Cultural governance
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INTRODUCTION
“No matter in which periods of pragmatic leading of the 
revolutions, nation- building and reforms, our Chinese 
communists have always been loyal supporters and 
protectors of the ‘Chinese splendid traditional cultures’.” 
Xi Jinping made this declaration in his opening speech 
of Commemoration for the 2, 565th Anniversary of 
Confucius’ Birth in 2014 (Xinhua net, 2014). This meeting 
discourse occurs every five years and sees the highest 
scale. This was the first time that the supreme leader of 
the CCP had attended. During this 45-minute speech, Xi 
introduced 17 concepts from traditional Chinese thought 
(e.g. the unity of heaven and man 天人合一, the unity 
of knowledge and action 知行合一) to demonstrate 
their value in modern governance. He also argued 
that international society should preserve the diversity 
of civilization by citing Mencius: “It is an objective 
regulation that all things are different from one to 
another.” (物之不齐, 物之情也). Then Xi explicitly 
asserted his opposition to any attempt to replace the 
regime or ideology of another country, even with the 
background of globalization. On this point, Xi appeared 
to follow his predecessors Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, 
focussing on soft power, and the use of traditional 
Chinese culture in diplomacy. But Xi is more active than 
his predecessors in his emphasis on traditional Chinese 
culture. He appeals to a much broader base of traditional 
culture, to cultivate among the public a notion of its 
asserted morality for China’s future stability. Yet Xi and 
the CCP have maintained efforts to adapt traditional 
classics since he came to power in 2012 and during his 
accumulation of power. On the way to the reinforcement of 
his personal prestige, Xi utilizes the mass media and CCP 
propaganda system to shape himself as a leader meeting 
communist ideals. His ambition is not just continuing 
the party’s opening and reform policy to develop the 
national economy, but also to focus on citizens’ cultural 
living construction. (Kerry, et al., 2018). In this process, 
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Xi reminds many Chinese citizens of the Mao era (IBID, 
2018). But Xi presents a different position from Mao 
in dealing with traditional Chinese thought. After the 
opening reform, the perspective of totally denying of 
traditional Chinese culture has disappeared. Xi has 
described his notions of splendid traditional thought and 
culture as the “soul” and “root” of the nation (Xinhua net, 
2016). “‘Splendid traditional culture’ should be a country 
and nation’s foundation for duration and promotion. Once 
we lost it as severing a country and nation’s expectancy” 
(Phoenix News, 2016). Similarly, “Flourishing Chinese 
culture is a prerequisite for the great revival of the 
Chinese nation” (Phoenix News, 2016). Although there 
are vague concepts of Confucianism in official discourse, 
the CCP still has the initiative and capacity of defining 
this “Confucianism;” when Xi Jinping visited Qufu, the 
hometown of Confucius, he emphasized the importance 
and influence of Confucianism in Chinese history (People.
cn, 2013). In general, it seems like that Xi completely 
praised the Confucian achievement, but official discourse 
does not give the concrete definition of Confucianism; 
it has just advocated the Confucian hierarchy and moral 
value such as citizens’ responsibility to be glad for their 
social status, the officers of party should keep their official 
morality (guande 官德). On the one hand, from scholars 
of New Confucianism such as Jiang Qing (2003), Gan 
Chunsong (2003), Chen Ming (2014) and Daniel A. Bell 
(2016), they uphold the imperial Confucian value which 
should be restored in current ideology such as Confucian 
constitutions, political meritocracy and institutional 
Confucianism. The central government has released some 
space and support for this research, and absorbed part 
of New Confucianism. Some of them pointed out the 
party-led Confucianism can be the compromise of the 
New left of China and western libertinism (Smith et al, 
2018). Furthermore, the party’s promotion and lifting of 
Confucianism could ensure their cultural leadership. The 
party is interested more in the importance of the political 
function of Confucianism. Representative scholars 
who support stable authority rather than the revival of 
Confucianism are Fang Keli, Chen Lai and Gan Yang. 
Their perspective is that the Confucianism should be 
modernized following the Modernization of China (Fang, 
2008), or that a fusion of both the New Left and New 
Confucianism has proved the concept in Confucianism of 
unifying the three traditions (tong san tong 通三统). Gan 
(2005) asserted that Confucianism, Mao Zedong thought 
and Deng Xiaoping Theory can be connected in order 
to gain legitimacy from China’s historical civilization. 
Besides Gan Yang and Fang Keli, Chen Lai also does 
not limit himself to Confucian classics; he has frequently 
attended official symposiums, and in 2015 he gave a 
speech about “patriotism” to the Politburo Standing 
Committee. He also insisted that the development of 
Confucianism is led by Marxism and the CCP in mainland 
China. (Xinhua Net, 2016). On the other hand, Confucius 
and Confucianism stand for Chinese soft power as an 
international brand, providing a new alternative to Western 
democracy. (Xue, 2009; Cheng, 2007) Throughout these 
scholars’ contribution to Confucianism, even the term 
Confucianism receives no clear definition, but parts of 
Confucian moral valuse and terms have been changed by 
the CCP for political and cultural use. Official propaganda 
has unified this cultural resurgence which included current 
Confucianism as “splendid traditional Chinese culture” 
(中华优秀传统文化). In the official narrative, “splendid 
Chinese traditional culture” promotes the development 
of socialist material and spiritual civilization and all the 
valuable spiritual achievements (Li, 2013). This vague 
term is continuously undergoing adaption by the CCP.
Xi has frequently cited the Chinese classics in his 
speeches as part of this revival. In official discourse, 
mainstream CCP propaganda has declared that they have 
encountered the ideological challenges in this period 
(Ren, 2012). In order to prevent this danger, the defense 
of Chinese characteristics was the only way to win this 
ideological contest (Ibid, 2012). For the contents of CCP 
member’s cultivation in Xi Jinping’s opening speech, 
he frequently cited Confucian classics and so-called 
officially defined “outstanding patriotic” intellectuals. 
He also reiterated this revival is China’s pragmatic use of 
Marxism and Socialism from his predecessors Hu Jintao’s 
government of harmonious society (Xinhua news, 2018). 
Xi appears to see nationalism as a means of offsetting 
the impact of slowing economic growth, which might 
otherwise reduce the CCP’s authority and legitimacy. 
Many scholars have noted the revival of Confucianism 
in mainland China since the 1990s, which probably 
could offer the CCP a new alternative foundation for 
legitimacy and soft power internationally (Bell, 2010; 
Billioud, 2009; Ford, 2011; William, 2011). The domestic 
resurgence of interest in traditional culture has included 
the construction of numerous research institutes and study 
societies, official symposiums, the restoration of historical 
sites, and an increasingly voluminous scholarship. 
Through this, the CCP is attempting to establish a nexus 
between governmental policies and this revival for “a 
new academic interest” among official intellectuals 
searching “for ways of dealing with domestic current 
social and political dilemmas” (Samth et al., 2018). In 
the creation of cultural industries of traditional culture, 
the potential capacity of this revival has been explained 
as specific Chinese culture for promoting national pride 
and nationalism (Liu, 2014; Cheung, 2012; Li, 2009; Zou, 
2013). But at present, the effectiveness of this revival is 
still under question.
Facing academic skepticism, this study will examine 
representative quotations from Confucian classics in the 
speeches of three top leaders of the CCP. This interest 
in the classics could promote positive effects for regime 
stability, particularly in the case of Xi Jinping’s speeches.
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Xi has sought traditional strands of Chinese faith 
philosophies to help his governance, not only the Analects 
of Confucius, but also relatively recondite statements 
displaying a deeper engagement with other classical 
works. The CCP’s official media have praised this 
phenomenon as “creative transformation and utilization 
the Chinese traditional culture” (People’s daily, 2017), 
and “change obscure ancient language to the popular 
knowledge” (People.cn, 2017). When CCP propaganda 
declared that “Xi Jinping citing the splendid Chinese 
classics manifest the spiritual power of great national 
rejuvenation”, (People.cn, 2014) it seems elements of the 
Chinese classics could be included in the modern national 
project. Although the domestic media has attempted 
to track this tendency, many essays and reports have 
simply focused on the relevant content in government 
propaganda. In China, culture is manipulated by the 
party. Some political slogan such as the “Chinese 
dream” and “socialist core values”, imply Confucian 
values. The CCP has expressed a unified vision of the 
ambitions of the Party and the people, at least in official 
propaganda. In this project of traditional revival, the 
party hopes to establish strong national sentiment for 
close connection with the people (Merics, 2016). Xi’s 
language and style implies this approach, as the current 
CCP endeavors to gain public faith through reference 
to various forms of classical Chinese thought for 
establishing emotional as well as cohesive power.
This paper will argue that Xi has occupied a dominant 
position in the CCP’s ideological work, and that he 
actively draws lesson from classical works which have 
been absorbed and changed by the party in his speeches as 
moral icons for Confucian values. Xi can utilize cultural 
aspirations to meet rising nationalism and reinforce 
the stability of the CCP regime. Firstly, this paper will 
compare Xi with his predecessors in adaption of Chinese 
classics, but also consider their different political effects. 
Examples of Xi’s wider adoption of Chinese classics 
are distributed across many fields of governance policy, 
including anti-corruption efforts, “patriotic” and “moral” 
education, cultural development and security, all of which 
consolidate his paternalism. Concurrently, it is precisely 
that Xi has given an alternative ideology which links the 
CCP with historical connotations of traditional Chinese 
sages. His re-evaluation of these materials indicate that the 
party headed by Xi is using traditional concepts to impel 
citizens’ conservative climate. These efforts are aimed at 
maintaining political loyalty and strengthening ideological 
legitimacy. Secondly, the Analects of Confucius and the 
Quotations of Chairman
Mao will be compared with Xi’s collected works. 
Finally, this paper will analyze how president Xi conflates 
Confucianism and traditional Chinese culture with 
the party’s political thought for the regime’s stability. 
Although CCP propaganda still declared that the leading 
position of ideology is Marxism, they also broadcast many 
traditional classics to describe their governance. Xi’s 
extensive citing of classical works will help the party’s 
revision of traditional Chinese culture to respond to social 
problems. But every adoption from the Chinese classics 
is designed to give the public a perfect guarantee at this 
stage, since the government in general has not changed 
reality in any way.
1.  QUOTING THE CLASSICS IN A 
CHINESE NARRATIVE
This study will focus on the use of quotations by leaders 
of the CCP. The contents of this rhetorical approach is 
“quotation from the classics” (yongdian 用典). This is 
“a factual allusion, one adduces a fact to support some 
generalization; and in a textual reference, one cites an 
ancient text to support a statement” (Hsieh et al, 2015). The 
description of this concept dates to the earliest analyses 
of rhetoric by Liu Xie (c. 465–c. 520) in his The Literary 
Mind and the Carving of Dragons (文心雕龙).
The reason for this writing technique’s emergence 
is complicated, according to Luo (2002), Originally, 
the quotation of classical works is derived from the 
authors’ desire to achieve a rhetorical effect. This approach 
commonly appears in traditional Chinese prose and poetry. 
Appropriate use involves citation without clarification 
(Wu, 2008, p.125 and Luo, 2002). “The cited ancient 
sentences are sparkling ladders which jump into the 
universe; the author is wandering though the historical 
space-time to get inspiration rather than locked in the 
language.” (Ye, 1992, p.71). This traditional writing 
skill has become the motif in authors’ minds when 
this coincides with sentiments in front of authors. When 
a quotation appears in prose or in a poem, it means the 
words written by author do not represent only their initial 
meanings, but also represent the deeper implications as 
determined by the reader’s induction. Wu Liquan (2002) 
has given readers the comprehensive research about 
Chinese Euphemistic rhetoric and different sorts of 
definition of using allusions: “from a certain rhetoric 
purpose, the authors will apply for this kind of rhetorical 
technique which is the ancient stories or the modern 
sentences with its origin”. However, it is known that 
the effectiveness of this writing method occurred in 
Chinese literary works of imperial times (Wu, 2005). 
In recent years, studying and applying “outstanding 
traditional culture” has gained favour among official 
leaders. Many of the CCP’s top leaders are in favor of 
citing Chinese classics in their speeches, especially under 
Xi Jinping’s administration. In 2013, Xi urged students 
of the Central Party School to study the “splendid 
traditional Chinese culture” in their normal life and 
works. (Xi, 2018) Then in 2016 and 2017, the Central 
Party School hosted an official symposium concerning 
“the approach of impelling the party cadres to learn 
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national studies (guoxue 国学)”. At this symposium, 
many scholars asserted that both Marxism and “Chinese 
splendid traditional classics” belonged to national 
studies, and that party cadres should follow chairman 
Xi’s speeches to study how to use “splendid culture” 
(Wang, 2018). A series of books and news reports have 
recorded CCP leaders’ citing of classical Chinese works, 
in order to display their supposed wisdom in governance. 
When the politicians or the intellectuals hope to express 
their appeals, the range of these classical quotations has 
widened from literary expression to political subtext. It 
has enriched this terminology’s implication under the 
narrative of modern China. The focus of this study is to 
examine whether the use of such allusions has developed 
in modern China, it is not just enhancing the effectiveness 
of articles or speeches. In the understanding of most 
Chinese social elites and intellectuals, the higher the 
political position that people have, the more complicated 
the meaning expressed in their use of allusions. 
2.  THE USE OF CHINESE CLASSICS 
UNDER JIANG ZEMIN AND HU JINTAO
To examine the situation of CCP leaders’ citing of the 
Chinese classics, quotations by presidents Jiang Zemin 
and Hu Jintao of Chinese classical works did not get 
sufficient attention from academic articles and news 
reports about their opening speeches. Their quotations 
can only be traced in their personal collected works in 
official CCP publications. In contrast to Xi Jinping’s style 
of speech, it appears that Hu and Jiang were not keen on 
citing classical works because they preferred more to 
emphasize economic development. Xi has cited Chinese 
classics with more frequency than his predecessors, but 
these two former CCP leaders cited classical works in 
domestic speeches to express their personal knowledge. 
They cited Chinese classics after their political slogans a 
few times, frequently citing classical works in diplomatic 
affairs; this style of diplomatic speech has been retained to 
this day. The CCP has told other countries that they are 
controlling ’China’s cultural legacy.
Mao Zedong launched the “Four Olds” campaign 
during the Cultural Revolution, intended to destroy 
“old culture”. This was followed by the “Criticize Lin 
Biao, Criticize Confucius” campaign from 1973 to 1976 
(Lu, 2004). This campaign ended after three years. Even 
early CCP leaders were influenced by classical Chinese 
works. For example, Li (2016) examines this heritage 
in his book’s preface: “After the establishment of ’New 
China’ (The People’s Republic of China), most party 
leaders and national leaders often cited phrases from the 
Chinese classics to express their expectations, wishes 
or warnings against corruption in their speeches for 
various occasions. . . . Within these quotations, not only 
their personal merit and knowledge expression, there are 
also closely related to the reform of the country.” The 
above comments are not without rational explanation. 
Just as western parties have held political campaigns 
to gain support in attaining policy goals, the CCP’s top 
leaders did not just abandon all relationship with the 
past but selected concepts that could be broadly related 
to China’s economic development and normative 
ideology. After 1989, cultural expenditure in the 
following years o immediately increased by over 200 
million RMB per year (from 1, 357, 000, 000 RMB in 
1989 to 1, 946, 000, 000 RMB in 1992). This figure has 
continued to increase ever since. Even in the 2008 global 
financial crisis, the nation-state continued to invest more 
funding in the cultural sphere (Marginson, 2011). In 
2010, official spending was 52, 952, 000, 000 RMB, 
representing a fiftyfold rise in twenty years. (Culture 
Financial Planning Department, 2011). However, the 
reason for this increased spending on cultural affairs 
over the past twenty years is complicated; it means the 
CCP have placed increasing value on ideological control. 
In the ideological realm, the 1989 Tiananmen uprising 
reminded party leaders of the need to attend to regime 
legitimacy; as a result, they attempted to shift reliance 
on the Marxism-Leninism system toward a pragmatic 
ideology. More importantly, the CCP has pointed out 
some tactical terms which implied the Chinese classics to 
express Chinese modernization construction and ensured 
that process was under their leadership. For example, as 
early as the rule of Deng Xiaoping, the final aim of 
the moderately prosperous society (xiao kang she hui 
小康社会) will achieve both economic a n d  cultural 
prosperity in modern China. This term is derived from the 
Li Yun chapter of the Book of Rites, (Pei et al,  2015) 
But Deng Xiaoping did not refer to any classical works 
in his justification of a prosperous society. In his selected 
works, Deng Xiaoping interpreted prosperous society 
in simple language and expressed his hope of finally 
constructing a spiritual civilization in the process 
of achieving economic development: “The so-called 
moderately prosperous society means that ordinary people 
can feed themselves. I believe that our productive 
forces’ keeps promotion, and maintain a stable rate of 
economic growth, we will achieve the balance of two 
civilizations (liang ge wen ming 两个文明), and building 
the socialist spiritual civilization (she hui zhu yi jing shen 
wen ming 社会主义精神文 明) will come out.” (Deng, 
1994). The aim was to ‘cultivate people’ in the process 
of Chinese modernity. This was not to be achieved by 
fierce fighting, but on the contrary, it tried to adopt the 
Confucian term “moderately prosperous society”.
Under the rule of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, 
economic construction was a priority for economic 
growth. Due to economic achievements, the CCP’s rule 
was accepted by the people. But the events of Tiananmen 
warned them pf the potential dangers to legitimacy. (Tai, 
2014, Qin et al, 2017 and Li et al, 2016). Some scholars 
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have given another interpretation: CCP leaders think that 
creating wealth to safeguard the citizen’s basic living is the 
most important responsibility for government during the 
Chinese modernization process because Chinese cultural 
traditions still permeate the political values of the Chinese 
people on some issues such as standardized principles for 
people’s behaviors (Li, 1985). These views of the CCP’s 
economic aims has absorbed Confucianism’s people-
based ideology of min ben 民本 from Mencius: “When 
people have enough material and prosperity, then they will 
loyal to the government.” （有恒产者有恒心） (Yuan, 
2011; Pei et al, 2015). Therefore, in order to understand 
the current revival of Chinese classical allusions, the 
attitudes of two previous leaders’ can be used as a point 
of reference. They not only continued the priority of 
economic development but also focused on the revival of 
Chinese cultural governance. CCP propaganda has tried to 
report some top leaders’ self- cultivation which confirms to 
that of traditional social elites. As for Jiang Zemin’s citing 
Chinese classical works, the verses and couplets frequently 
emerged in his speeches, so some CCP members called 
Jiang’s quotation an “art” (Sun et al, 2008): “He is good at 
applying Chinese ancient culture to reply to real problems 
in Marxism ideology” (Sun et al, 2008 and Wu, 1996). The 
most frequently cited was a couplet written by the loyal 
minister Shi Kefa of the late Ming dynasty, used by Jiang 
on diplomatic occasions in 1989, 1991, and 1995 that 
related to his rising political views of the Chinese Great 
national rejuvenation and patriotism.
At the end of October 1989, Jiang Zemin, who 
had been just elected General Secretary of the CPC 
Central Committee, met with former US President 
Nixon in Beijing after the “Tiananmen Incident”. Jiang 
demonstrated the CCP’s intention to resist Western 
pressure (People.cn, 2012). He cited one couplet written 
by Shi Kefa: ‘The few fallen plum petals are the tears of 
a conquered nation; the heart of previous loyal minister 
is broken like the fragile moon. ’(数点梅花亡国泪, 
二分明月故臣 心). The CCP propaganda reported that 
some western countries led by the United States imposed 
so-called sanctions on China, Jiang explained that he 
had seen this couplet under Shi Kefa’s memorial hall 
and that the merits of Shi Kefa encouraged his national 
sentiment (Ibid, 2012). Shi had refused to submit to the 
Qing dynasty after the fall of the Ming. Although the 
1989 crackdown pressured the CCP to construct a new 
ideological framework, the regime tried to control rising 
nationalism by emphasizing national pride after 1989 
(Zhao, 2003).
This couplet was later twice cited by Jiang in the 
Patriotic Education Campaign in 90s. The CCP has 
placed emphasis on nationalism, such as the victim 
image of China in contemporary history. In 1991 when a 
Soviet reporter asked Jiang Zemin about his youth, Jiang 
told this story and argued that this couplet could inspire 
patriotism (Wu, 1996). The following year, when Jiang 
inspected the Chinese Embassy in Finland, he also stressed 
this couplet to the staff of the embassy, arguing that if 
people did not have intense national sentiment to devote to 
their nation, there was no hope for it. (Ibid, 1996).
Two years later, the Central Propaganda Department 
promulgated “Guidelines for the implementation of 
patriotic education”. These Guidelines highlighted that 
patriotic education should be established by a long-
term mechanism to ensure its efficiency. From the three 
quotations of the couplet, the state-launched Patriotic 
Education Campaign conducted with emphasis on national 
glories in the 1990s attempted to warn citizens against 
the temptations of “western liberalism” by highlighting 
cultural pride for the Chinese past and the sacrifices of 
the CCP in liberating the Chinese nation (Guo, 2003 and 
Callahan, 2010). By using the couplet of She Kefa, the 
CCP hoped to rebuild its moral authority.
Furthermore, the CCP also advocated the building of 
nationalism since Jiang pointed out the “great national 
rejuvenation” (min zu wei da fu xing 民族伟大复 兴) 
slogan after adopting patriotism. The aim of national 
rejuvenation was reaching
to be a great national state and encouraging a sense 
of victimhood amongst Chinese from contemporary 
history in order to achieve great global acceptance and 
power (Perry, 2013 and Gregory et al, 2016). Therefore, 
nationalism and patriotism were the direction of 
propaganda work under Jiang Zemin. However, in view 
of Jiang’s use of calligraphy, he was in favor of giving 
inscriptions when he inspected schools and scenic spots. 
Until now, his inscriptions exist nationwide (Sohu, 2014). 
He may also have done this for his personal reputation.
Until Hu Jintao took over from Jiang in 2002, 
the concept of “great national rejuvenation” was 
enriched, ‘The Chinese nation is a great nation with a long 
history and splendid culture. In the history of human 
improvement and development, the Chinese nation had 
been in a leading position for a long time. It was only 
in the Qing Dynasty that it turned from prosperity to 
decline.’ (People’s daily, 2011). However, this report 
exaggerated China’s cultural achievements in the past. 
Hu Jintao asserted that “culture is the blood of a nation.” 
Hu Jintao explicitly called for reviving “traditional” 
Chinese culture and made multiple references to the “great 
revival of the Chinese nation” after taking power. (China 
news, 2007) Starting from the Seventeenth Party Congress 
in 2007, the Hu Jintao administration paid significant 
attention to resurrecting both socialism and traditional 
Chinese culture as a tool to defend the degraded mind 
eroding Chinese society (Wenming.cn, 2012). Since CCP 
Politburo elites seemed to believe society was suffering 
from serious moral decay, (Heath, 2012), the CCP thought 
they should find a way to consolidating its legitimacy. 
To enrich this political proposition, Hu Jintao pointed his 
political slogan of “Harmonious society”, the ultimate 
aim of the “scientific development concept”. It could 
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be a huge policy project that seeks to balance China’s 
progress of economic growth with equal emphasis 
on resolving social welfare issues. (Xinhua, 2004). 
Then, in 2006, Hu encouraged renewed popular moral 
education under the doctrine of the “Eight Honors and 
Eight Shames”. Hu also named this series of concepts as 
a “socialist value system” which could match his theory 
of harmonious society. He also emphasized the mixture of 
Confucianism and Marxism in governing moral qualities 
and in national culture”, (Johnson, 2017). At the same 
time, he also emphasized the CCP’s heritage and adopted 
a new means of citing Chinese classical works to unify 
citizens’ minds in following CCP political agendas. If 
the measure of heritage of the inner party such as the 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” of Deng Xiaoping 
and Jiang Zemin is also the style of Hu’s speeches, Hu 
frequently used the rhetorical language of citing famous 
CCP “comrades” (Heisey, 2007). Hu often praised the 
patriots who were sacrificed in the liberation of China and 
in resistance to invaders; he loved to display to the public 
that he was good at finding inspirations in China’s history 
of resistance, such as one speech at Xibaipo 西柏坡, a 
revolutionary base.
In 2002, Hu Jintao organized a group of officials 
from the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee 
to inspect Xibaipo in Hebei province. Mao had once 
led troops there. When Hu was there, he cited a 
series of Chinese classics to remind CCP members of 
“revolutionary spirit.” “Our ancestors always said, ‘be 
prepared for danger in times of peace and use frugality 
to guard against extravagance (居安思 危, 戒奢以俭)’; 
‘anxiety and hard work can revive a country; enjoyment 
and self- satisfaction can destroy the person (忧劳兴国, 
逸豫亡身); and ‘thrive in calamity [adversity] and perish 
in a life of ease’(生于忧患, 死于安乐). These proverbs 
of warning still play an important role in enlightening us 
today. It is hard for a party to flourish without a hard-
working spirit. As this spirit of our party’s outstanding 
tradition and our Marx’s political character, is the 
key to unite the party and the people and inspire the 
whole Party and all the people together to revitalize the 
powerful spiritual force to achieve national prosperity.” 
(Hu, 2002). In this speech, the CCP had sought to explore 
the traditional heritage in CCP members’ education with 
China’s long cultural history. The first proverb derived 
from advice from the famous chancellor Wei Zheng to 
Emperor Taizong in the Tang dynasty. Hu Jintao attempted 
to demonstrate that the CCP today has the same merit as 
a famous dynasty in Chinese history. Hu Jintao did not 
explain these proverbs, and after this speech, official 
propaganda gave no interpretation; it was so confused that 
audiences perhaps could not understand the meaning of 
these proverbs in that context.
Although uncommon in his career, this was enough 
to explain Hu’s ruling characteristics, starting to revival 
the traditional Chinese classics works as conflated with 
Chinese glorious past; this “past” also involved the CCP’s 
anti-western history in contemporary China. This was 
just an experiment, because in the CCP revolutionary 
base, top leaders cited classical works to educate CCP 
members. The scope of the quotations used by Jiang and 
Hu remain limited; there was no good interpretation from 
official sources. As a result, the mixture between the two- 
contradictory cultures, Marxism and Chinese traditional 
culture, did not emerge clearly under the Jiang and Hu 
governments.
Nevertheless, classical rhetoric was vague in domestic 
speeches, but Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin actively adopted 
it in the diplomatic realm; they made up a concept of 
Chinese characteristics and sought to use the resources 
of Chinese culture to display this concept. Jiang Zemin 
argued that if the West wanted to understand China, it 
is can do so from many perspectives. When he visited 
the United States in 1997, he attempted to display 
traditional Chinese wisdom and its purpose of peaceful 
development with classical quotations, because China 
aimed to improve its relationship with the US and seek 
economic cooperation. (Chen, 2011). When Jiang Zemin 
visited the United States in 1997, he gave a speech at 
Harvard University on “Enhancing mutual understanding 
and strengthening friendly cooperation” (Sohu, 2009). 
At the beginning of the speech, Jiang outlined his core 
message: “In order to promote the development of Sino-
US relations . . . the United States needs to know more 
about China. . . . A valuable angle for understanding 
China is from its history and culture.” (Ibid, 2009). He 
then introduced some of China’s “outstanding merit” 
later in the speech and quoted the Zuo commentary on the 
Spring and Autumn Annals (Zuo zhuan 左传) which dates 
to around 403 B.C.– 386 B.C. In China, Zuo zhuan is the 
earliest relatively mature chronicle existing today. It is an 
important source for pre-Qin history (Kong et al, 1999). 
Jiang elaborated: “The thinkers of the pre-Qin period put 
forward the idea of ‘The most precious thing in a state is 
being benevolent and friendly to neighbors (亲仁善邻, 
国之宝也)’, (Sohu, 2009). This sentence appeared 
in the context of conflict between two vassal states, 
Zheng and Chen, in the spring and autumn period. 
Before the conflict, a minister of Chen made this utterance 
when suggesting that his king negotiate with Zheng (Kong 
et al, 2009). This citation was an indirect attempt to reply 
to idea of the “China threat”. Some western pundits 
and scholars have advocated a strategy of “restraining” 
China, and doubt the possibility of a “peaceful rise.” 
The rising powers have risen rarely without launching 
a major war that reorganizes the international system 
to express a new reality (Charles, 1995 and Robert, 
2005). The rise of nationalist sentiment, accompanied 
by the spectacular development of economic and military 
capabilities sent a desired signal to the Asia- Pacific region 
and western countries, suggesting that China may take 
an aggressive path to attain its foreign policy aims (Peter, 
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2004). Hence on the international stage, Chinese leaders 
have frequently utilized traditional Chinese values which 
can stand for peace and a low profile because they believe 
that by broadcasting this traditional “peaceful pursuit” to 
the world, China could defuse the conception of it as a 
threat (Huang et al, 2006). Subsequently, Jiang cited one 
very famous phrase from The Book of Changes (Yi Jing 
易经). On Chinese tradition, Jiang said, “by observing 
the universal regulation, our ancestors pointed out that 
‘As Heaven keeps vigor through movement, a gentleman 
should unremittingly practice self-improvement, ’ 
(天行健 君子以自强不息). So the good merit from 
this sentence encourages Chinese people to continue 
unrelenting struggle and amounts of great reform……. 
There is only one pursuit: to complete the great national 
rejuvenation of China to make more contribution to the 
world.” (Sohu, 2009). This classical quotation had been 
interpreted in various ways in the past, but in Jiang’s 
narrative it could claim that the CCP was burdened with 
much responsibility in leading the state. The use of 
cultural appeals maintains the Communist Party’s moral 
and political stability by positing itself as the savior 
of China. (Perry, 2013). In the ambition of national 
rejuvenation, Jiang Zemin not only attempted to arouse 
the Chinese people to encourage pride in the past in 
order to avoid ideological discussion, but also presented a 
modest image to the United States.
Reconsideration of traditional Chinese culture 
continued after Hu Jintao came to power in 2002 
(Billioud, 2009, AI, 2014 and Heisey, 2007). Hu was also 
devoted to improving China’s soft power. When he gave 
a speech to Literary and Art Circles in November 2006, 
he emphasized that “the one who takes a leading position 
on the battlefield of cultural cultivation will gain the 
advance in drastic international competition.” (Hu, 
2006) In diplomatic affairs, Hu was sensitive to the fact 
that China’s long history and cultural values, studied by 
most scholars as a valuable source of national soft power, 
had attracted not only China’s east Asian neighbours, 
which share a Confucian heritage, but also the wider 
international community. (Huang et al, 2006). In this, 
Hu was more likely to choose Chinese characteristics 
associated with being “peaceful and friendly.” He used 
the same quotations as his predecessor, but he chose to 
correspond them with the “harmony society” concept as 
constructed in a domestic narrative and a peaceful and 
friendly image in the international community.
On April 2006, Hu Jintao gave a speech at Yale 
University in which he cited the same sentence of 
The Books of Changes as Jiang, emphasizing China’s 
national rejuvenation. Maybe Hu did not hope to change 
the situation in China’s diplomacy. In his speech, he 
explained Chinese cultural attractions. (Hu, 2006). 
Moreover, he also cited classical phrases, the most 
representative quotation being for his trademark policy, 
harmonious society. (Ai, 2014). He stressed that “China 
advocates the ‘human-oriented’(yi ren wei ben 以人为本) 
because this merit always inherits in our history. ‘People 
are the foundation of a country; when the foundation is 
stable, the country is at peace. Between heaven and earth, 
nothing is more valuable than human beings.’ (民惟邦本, 
本固邦宁；天地之间, 莫贵于人)”.  This sentence 
derived from The Book of History (Shangshu 尚书), 
one of the five classics. In the official view, the “human-
oriented” mind changed from past to present. The imperial 
meaning of the human-oriented mind is that the ruler 
must recognize the crucial influence of his people. Under 
imperial stability, the ruler should adopt this strategy to 
maintain his regime (Pei et al, 2015). Hu Jintao asserted 
the human- oriented mind at the 17th People’s Congress: 
“the human-oriented mind is guided by scientific view 
of development, and our party’s principle is contributing 
to the people. Therefore, insisting on the human-oriented 
means we should achieve development for the people, and 
development depends on people and the achievements 
of development will be shared by all people” (Hu, 2007). 
Hu mentioned the same proposition in international 
society: he unveiled the “harmonious world” at the Asia-
Africa Summit, where he appealed for the establishment 
of a new international political and economic order 
which depended on multilateralism, mutually beneficial 
cooperation, and the core mind of inclusiveness (China 
Daily, 2005). Sometimes Hu Jintao indicated that he still 
drew from his predecessor Jiang Zemin some ideas such as 
the rise of patriotism and the great national rejuvenation, 
even using the same quotations in his diplomatic speeches 
(Bo, 2004 and Heisey, 2007). But it can be understood as 
a combination with the CCP’s heritage. It still was an 
ambiguous attitude towards traditional Chinese culture 
in the CCP’s governance (Ai, 2014 and Chu, 2014).
The above analysis of the international speeches of 
Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s quotations demonstrates 
how they cited famous Chinese classical phrases in 
their speeches that made efforts internationally in the 
ideological and cultural realms. Although some western 
countries have feared that the “charm offensive” of China 
would be a general penetrative strategy to threaten the 
liberal values and democratic systems of the West (Huang 
et al, 2006), Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were focused 
on China’s economic development and avoided serious 
conflict (Bonnie, 2009). These Chinese leaders also 
recognized that traditional Chinese culture and nationalist 
sentiment could be cultivated by the state as ideological 
power to cope with western “peaceful evolution” after 
1989. In Jiang and Hu’s governments, they used the 
Chinese classics very casually. Traditional Chinese culture 
occupied an important part of the cultural dimension of 
‘Chinese characteristics’ in the regime before Xi Jinping’s 
administration (Cheung, 2012). But Chinese classical 
phrases cited by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were not give 
much attention by the media and academia, which is in 
contrast to such rhetoric under Xi Jinping.
36Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Quoting the Classics: An Alternative Reinforcement of Regime Legitimacy 
in China
3. XI JINPING AND THE GENTLEMAN 
(JUNZI  君子 )  OF CONFUCIANISM: 
PATERNALISTIC TRADIT ION AND 
HISTORICAL SELECTION
The Chinese classics had seen some political use by the 
CCP, particularly in Hu Jintao’s construction of “the 
harmony society”, but traditional Chinese cultural values 
were not mentioned in the CCP’s ideological creeds (Bo, 
2004, Josh, 2014 and Han et al, 2017). The classical 
allusions and phrases used in the speeches of CCP 
leaders were not given explicit explanation by official 
propaganda. Only a small number of scholars have 
given attention to the classical phrases in the speeches 
of CCP leaders before Xi Jinping’s administration. But 
Xi Jinping frequently preaches Confucian values in his 
speeches. Official intellectuals not only are involved in 
academic study, but they are also exploring practical ways 
of moving towards Confucian values and recommend 
relevant policies (Chu, 2014, Merics, 2016 and Han et 
al, 2017).Besides the efforts of Xi and party academia, 
the party’s huge propaganda machine has focused its 
efforts on Xi’s individual image, and has given a standard 
explanation of classical quotations in official context via 
publications and reports (Perry, 2013, Javier et al, 2017 
and Kerry et al, 2018). These three aspects are the CCP’s 
new efforts of “advocating classical readings”.
In order to seek the motivation behind this revival, the 
socialist Edward Shils’s can be used to examine the social 
function of “traditionality” theory (Shils, 1971). Shils 
suggests that the function of tradition is the continuity of 
culture; tradition’s efficacy relies on people’s reverence 
for traditions. Furthermore, he pointed out that tradition 
is a cultural force with normative function and moral 
appeal to social behavior (Ibid, 1971). Shils’s perspective 
of traditionality was interpreted as statement on “cultural 
identity” by mainstream views’ in Chinese academia. The 
identity of a value tradition in a nation is the spiritual link 
that condenses the national community and the spiritual 
foundation for the continuation of the life of this national 
community. (Zhu et al, 2008 and Chen, 2017).
In their speeches, Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao and Jiang 
Zemin all all declared that “the Chinese splendid 
traditional culture is the bond of our nation”. Yet Xi goes 
further than his predecessors. He claimed that the CCP 
has always been the supporter and protector of Chinese 
traditional culture, a view that may gain the trust of 
cultural conservatives (Pri.org, 2017, Merics, 2017, Yang, 
2017 and New York times, 2017). While CCP propaganda 
never mentions the destruction of traditional Chinese 
culture in the 1960s, the impact of cultural revolutionary 
campaigns is naturally ignored, but the essence of cultural 
revolution is personal worship and paternalism, and this 
essence has influenced the current adaptation of Chinese 
classics (Joy, 2008; Han, et al, 2017).
The revival of classical Chinese phrases derives from 
the Chinese paternalistic tradition of identity to establish 
the paternal and gentleman figure of the Confucian 
hierarchy (Gregory et al, 2016, Javier et al, 2017 and 
Chris, 2018). In order to improve the reputation of 
Xi through Chinese classical values, on the one hand, 
the first deployment was employing the official huge 
propaganda machine to publicize the “Moral Vacuum” and 
the importance of Chinese traditional culture. (Guangming 
Online, 2017 and Yang, 2017). A survey among Chinese 
citizens of their sense of traditional culture in daily life 
shows that 28.9 percent of 2, 976 participants chose “very 
crucial,” 47.4 percent interviewees picked “important,” 
and only 3.5 percent selected “unimportant”. (Pri.org 
2017) Another survey by Guangming Online (2017) of 
“favorite TV programs”, shows that almost one third (28.9 
percent) of participants expressed that foreign culture 
had a “disadvantageous impact on traditional Chinese 
culture.” This research indicates that it is an aspiration 
for people who have appealed to “spiritual meaning.” 
On the other hand, some Confucian scholars insist 
that moral problems could be resolved by Confucian 
values because Confucianism stresses social order and 
family values; these values should be lead by the “sage 
emperor” of the country and the “father” of families.
This is the theory that the government would restore the 
trust from citizens (Jiang, 2003, Liu, 2014 and Tan, 2015). 
Some suggested that the Confucian idea of a role- based 
society could achieve the moral commitment by means of 
social role-based cultivation; different people should be 
required to behave properly as fit for their positions. (Israel, 
2016 and Stephens, 2018) Therefore, in a country where 
even ordinary conversation often proceeds through obscure 
aphorisms from classical literature, it makes sense for Xi to 
demonstrate his sophistication.
Many Chinese classical phrases cited by Xi display 
the image of a role model for traditional values because 
he has reevaluated Chinese classical phrases in his 
speeches. For example, in his first meeting with domestic 
and foreign reporters after Xi Jinping took power in 2012 
and at the end of his inaugural speech, he promised that 
“we should always insist to be intimate with people, 
suffer with people, unite with people; ‘attend to work dawn 
until night’(su ye zai gong 夙夜在公).” (Gov.cn, 2012). 
Originally, this phrase appeared several times in The Book 
of Songs (Shi jing 诗经). It describes a tough life of labors 
and junior officials during the Spring and Autumn period 
(Cheng et al, 1991) working day and night for the ruler. 
Later, the phrase was used to praise a good work attitude. 
Therefore, Xi tried to express that he could totally devote 
himself to his work. To emphasize this, the “attend to 
work dawn until night” appeared frequently in official 
media. The media also made a continuous report in 2015 
to evidence the diligent works of Xi. With the headline 
of “one thousand days of ‘attending to work dawn until 
night’” (“夙夜在公”的一 千天), this report employed 
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stirring rhetoric to enumerate Xi’s great contributions to 
national development. “Since the 18th congress, the Party 
Central Committee and Xi Jinping have acquired striking 
efforts in governing the country and responded to the 
expectations of the people; these actions gained praise 
from the world. The prospects of the Chinese nation 
are grand” (China news, 2015). Phrases such as “attend 
to work dawn until night”, appearing in speeches by 
Xi have strongly promoted his personal status, since this 
represents finding knowledge, moral justice and moral 
aspiration from classic texts (Josh, 2014). After this 
portrayal of Xi emerged, and the status of Xi Jinping’s 
thought in the constitution was confirmed after 19th 
congress, he gained the title “leader” (lingxiu 领袖) as did 
Mao Zedong. (Javier, 2017, China Media project, 2018 
and Chris, 2018). The ongoing increase in Xi’s status 
represents his moral and political responsibilities. This 
is because the Chinese people still have a tendency for 
pursuing moral values (Merics, 2017).
These characteristics of China’s leadership is 
established by moral concepts and authoritative relations. 
It is continuous with traditional values, as traditional 
Chinese heritage has a “long history of valuing leadership 
and preparing leaders on moral grounds” (Wu, 2014). In 
Chinese leadership, morality is the first criterion for 
examining officials (e.g. Li et al, 2005; Ling et al, 2000). 
But Chinese political tradition contains paternalistic 
values as well. Social elites and common people just 
request and relate to merit shown by their leaders or rulers 
unconsciously (Wu, 2014; Cottine, 2016; Gregory, et al, 
2016; Rutgers, 2017).
In the early Qing dynasty, students had to learn to 
recite, and they often began with the Thousand Character 
Classic ( Qianziwen 千字文), the Three-character Classic 
( Sanzijing 三字经), and the Hundred Names (Baijiaxing 
百家姓).  Students expecting to join the examinations 
process moved on to the Four Books and Five Classics 
(sishu wujing 四书五经), all texts containing paternalism 
and respect for tradition. (Gregory, et al, 2016). Chinese 
modern Leadership power not only comes from character 
as well as from duty in the regime’s hierarchy. (Xiao et 
al, 2014) If a leader presents good morality, subordinates 
will follow out of respect and trust. (Wu, 2014) Chinese 
public leaders are cultivated by strong moral reputations 
rooted in traditional culture. Its regulations conform 
with paternalistic Chinese leadership values such as liwei 
立威 (inspiring awe or fear), and shude 树德 (setting 
a moral role model). While political elites enjoy their 
power, they are required to follow classical doctrines that 
demand that the ruler have concern for others. (Conttine, 
2016). In other words, Xi has undertaken responsibility 
for his promises to the people, such as “the Chinese 
dream and the great national rejuvenation.” As a Chinese 
leader or a gentleman (junzi) who has mixed his political 
ideology with Chinese philosophy, he must be seen to be 
seeking inspiration in more substantive works.
This revival of Chinese classical phrases is also about 
the CCP strategy for legitimacy. Firstly, the strategic level 
of CCP legitimacy is definitely not based on the contents 
or values of traditional Chinese classical phrases or 
Chinese tradition. To analyze the quality of the connection 
with classical phrases and the strategy for legitimacy, 
it is clear that the Chinese leadership is aware of the 
fragility of its Leninist institutions. Today the theory of 
“class struggle” has disappeared from the CCP’s official 
discourse (Joy, 2008), but this does not mean that the CCP 
is released from regulating current ideology. The official 
and professor Ren Jie (2012) argues that “our party is also 
facing the problems of ideological construction such as 
hostile forces of the West’s permeation and the influence 
of foreign values on our indigenous values”. Behind 
closed doors, Xi and other Communist Party leaders are 
worried about how to combat inner party issues such 
as corruption, and whether China will suffer the same 
catastrophe as the collapse of the former Soviet Union. 
But the CCP has always applied Marx-Leninism theory 
to solve domestic problems (Bell, 2010). Lams (2018) 
suggested about this dilemma, The CCP’s legitimacy is 
now thought to rely on its ‘accordance with traditional 
notions of good governance”. Therefore, even in Hu 
Jintao’s discourse, dominant observations in political 
discourse still repeat socialist rhetoric and insist on the 
Chinese characteristics of the socialist market economy, 
mixed with a revival of Chinese traditional values and 
culture. Throughout is Xi’s classical revaluation and 
official propaganda’s insistence on a “moral vacuum”.
Xi successfully describes the PRC as an essentially 
Chinese system, completely in accord with China’s 
own national character (Perry, 2013 and Lam, 2018). In 
addition, the CCP has tapped into a consistent domestic 
narrative considering that even if China’s economic and 
growing strength prove that China’s position in global 
affairs is not equal. China is still playing a weaken role in 
international community. (Qin et al, 2017). At this stage, 
Xi’s speeches accord with nationalist aims by citing 
Confucian moral values and classical phrases about the 
government’s responsibility to resolve issues in people’s 
daily life (Kerry et al, 2018 and Lams, 2018). Socialist 
ideology has been conflated with daily issues in modern-
day China and with China’s cultural and philosophical 
tradition. Officials and the common people all admit 
that the classics quoted by Xi correspond with China’s 
realities. As for the CCP’s orthodox doctrines, the content 
of its ‘strategic narratives’ does not deviate from essential 
faith in Communism. Xi also stressed that the “political 
corrects” such as the “four self-confident” theory. Xi 
also suggested the construction of people’s faith. The 
expression “citizens have faith, state has hope, country 
has power” (人民有信仰, 民族有希望, 国家有力量) 
(People.cn, 2017) is of great value for the CCP 
propaganda media and combines with a straightforward 
‘strong China’ narrative. The slogan states that a country 
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can only become powerful if people have a firm belief and 
faith in its future. That can be achieved by constructing a 
spiritual civilization, spreading both ‘excellent Chinese 
traditional culture’ and core socialist values. Xi Jinping 
demonstrates his efforts to repack traditional culture right 
there and then, recruiting Confucian paternalistic values 
(Xinhua News, 2015).
Nevertheless, this cultural self-confidence was clarified: 
“the most crucial core of a country’s comprehensive 
strength is cultural soft power.” “We must insist on our 
self-confidence in the theory, path and institutions [of 
Chinese-style socialism],” “Fundamentally, we also need 
to have cultural self-confidence” (Xinhua, 2015; People’s 
Daily, 2014). The CCP’s Cultural self-confidence’ has been 
added to the ‘three confidences’, being called ‘ideological 
confidence’. The adjustment in official discourse of 
the CCP legacy is also shown in altered descriptions 
of Chinese traditions in reevaluations of the doctrinal 
foundation. That is the ruling legitimacy into a new 
orthodoxy of the Party being fixed on Chinese traditional 
classics and proximate to Confucian moral values. (Lams, 
2018). But overall, the top three confidences explicitly 
demonstrate communist characteristics.
Most importantly, conveying these ideas in an easily 
acceptable way, Xi’s rhetoric attempts to be more 
valuable and effective in inspiring people. The rhetorical 
approach of could contribute to social solidarity (Burke, 
1962). Domestically, the integration of innovative and 
conservative intentions in the Chinese official narrative 
of the fourth-generation leadership is still obvious in the 
discourse of the Xi administration aimed at the Chinese 
population. Zhai (2018) also asserts that if there is a 
decline in traditional values, it will surely weaken the 
trust of institutions in government officials. Nevertheless, 
traditional values in the political arena are changing 
slowly, and their authoritarian nature supports political 
trust in the current regime, even the western liberal value 
has widespread broadcasted. Many Chinese citizens 
express poignant criticisms of their political system – 
from rampant corruption to government inaction. But 
a few charges that the system does not belong to China 
(Perry, 2013). Rather than articulate such problems to 
the detriment of a socialist system, disgruntled citizens 
are sensitive to ascribe the mistakes among the system 
to injustices rooted deeply in the soil of Chinese culture 
– nepotism, bureaucratism, preference for rule by man 
over rule of law, and remnants of the imperial system.
(Zhai, 2018) Chinese citizens still choose to trust current 
institutions because they think the central government 
has the power to solve problems suffered by China. 
Sometimes, if the central authority sacrificed the 
reputation of a local government, mainstream media 
would criticize the local governor for his loss of an 
official’s morality (guande 官 德 ). (Perry, 2013, Willy, 
2016 and Zhai, 2018). Although traditional Chinese values 
seem to impair the strategy for legitimacy, a series of 
publications about the classical quotations of Xi Jinping 
are the first such works since the reforms of 1978. Official 
discourse provides the standard orthodox interpretation 
of some Chinese classical works. The most representative 
work is Classical Aphorisms of Xi Jinping (习近平用典) 
published in 2015. This book has evolved into another set 
of doctrines for the CCP. In May 2018, “The first leading 
cadres learning the Chinese classics” (领导干部学国学) 
reading group of the Central Party School, the CCP 
members will be taught the Incorruptible education (lian 
zheng jiao yu 廉政教育) in the party school, the stories 
disinterested officers in imperial China is included to 
party’s teaching handbook together with revolutionary 
seniors. Moreover, CCP members have been demanded 
to study the Chinese classics to improve their governing 
ability and follow the spirit of Xi. Yet traditional values 
cannot be the source of the CCP’s legitimacy if the regime 
cannot resolve any real issues. It is a cultural barrier that 
CCP revived to protect the stability of an institution. 
The organizers of this club, Wang Jie and Zhu Kangyou, 
transformed “national study” to “pragmatic study” ( 
实学) and advocated that “reading is a lifestyle of CCP 
members.” (Wang, 2013)
Communication between current political authority 
and the glorious history of the nation is built on the 
emotional bond of people with traditional political values. 
For example, Xi cited the poetic works of Bai Juyi of 
the Tang dynasty: “Sincere emotion is the crucial element 
for moving people’s hearts.” (感人心者, 莫先乎情)
This sentence is cited by Xi in his 2017 Spring Festival 
speech. Xi emphasized that sincere emotion should be led 
by socialist core values, but also needed to be cultivated 
by Chinese traditional merit (Xi, 2017). This classical 
sentence originally expressed the concept of good skill 
in writing poetry. The official interpretation is “Pay more 
attention to sincere emotion is always Chinese people’s 
merit. Xi Jinping is such a person; he never forgets 
his relatives and friends.”(People’s Daily commentary 
department, 2018) In this narrative, Xi explicitly cited 
the classics to highlight the Chinese nation’s traditional 
emotion. He has implied that the people and he reach 
an emotional consciousness together. Another unique 
characteristic of Xi’s quotations is that he not only 
cites familiar Chinese classics such as the Analects of 
Confucius, but he also uses more complicated Chinese 
poetry or proverbs such as this quote from Bai Juyi. 
Because most people do not understand such works, Xi 
and the CCP can easily present their own interpretation. 
Citation of more sophisticated Chinese classics also 
demonstrates that Xi is a knowledge leader of China, and 
therefore he and his team are able to work for the Chinese 
people.
It is believed that the current CCP bears responsibility 
for “the great national rejuvenation” because they 
(the central government and its leaders) inherit the 
traditions and moral conduct of the past. But teaching 
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CCP officials the Chinese classics will shift the position 
of current dominant ideology. (Kang, 2014 and New 
York times, 2014) It seems likely that the CCP impaired 
the foundation of party culture, Marxism-Leninism, 
in order to transform the root of its legitimacy from 
Chinese communist doctrine to Confucian moral values. 
But Xi also needs to reach a balance between the New 
Left and the liberal faction, particularly from the New 
Left which believes that social income inequality derives 
from the capitalist market economy (Lams, 2018); Xi 
has enriched the extent of the historical portrayal of the 
Chinese nation’s resistance to western invasions. This has 
extended to the late nineteenth century, where all Chinese 
people were supposedly united, and has led to a rise in 
the reputations of Nationalist leaders like Chiang Kai-
shek (CCTV.com, 2017). To mark the 200th anniversary 
of Marx’s birth, Xi gave a speech to reassert the CCP’s 
dominance over society and pointed out the consolidation 
of devotion to the founding principles of Communism. 
(Xihua New, 2018). Though Xi has used traditional values 
to raise his own standing, it is also a rational political 
resource as evidenced by a CCP declaration: “We are 
not only chosen by the people; we are also the inevitable 
choice as selected by Chinese history.” 
4 .  T H E  P O L I T I C A L P H I L O S O P H Y 
IMPLIED BY “CLASSICAL APHORISMS 
BY XI JINPING”
In Xi Jinping’s frequently citations of Chinese classical 
phrases, apart from the revival of traditional moral values 
and paternalism is the CCP’s adoption of a new political 
philosophy and rhetoric style. This is especially well 
illustrated in the book Classical Aphorisms of Xi Jinping. 
It is the first book offering an official interpretation for 
fusing the thought of top CCP leaders and classical texts, 
but it follows form and style of two famous works: The 
Analects of Confucius and the so- called little red book, 
The Quotations of Chairman Mao. The preface, “Draw 
Power from Chinese Culture”, shapes Xi as a Confucian 
gentleman in learning and applying traditional morality 
and calls on the nation to construct the present and 
future with those values in cultural civilization. (People, 
2017). “Contemporary communists are engaged in a great 
struggle with many new historical features. We are rooted 
in the fertile soil of Chinese culture and have confirmed 
the tendency of period. . . . Therefore, in the relay of 
achieving the “Chinese dream”, we will write the new 
chapter.” (People’s Daily commentary department, 2015).
Normally for a book dedicated to speeches and 
writings of the Communist Party’s general secretary, the 
volume would contain quotations from Marx and Mao. 
However, reading like an individual guide for doctrine, 
it is divided into chapters on miscellaneous aspects of 
governance and filled with Xi’s classical proverbs. In 
establishing canonical values, by following the pattern and 
structure of The Analects of Confucius, the editors tried 
to accommodate Xi’s sovereign moral authority. Because 
the huge propaganda machine that is the People’s Daily is 
under party control, all books which collect Xi Jinping’s 
quotations only appear as People’s Daily publications. 
For example, besides Classical Aphorisms of Xi Jinping, 
there are “Xi Jinping tells stories” and “Xi Jinping, The 
governance of China”. the authors of these books were 
not Xi Jinping; they were all written by the commentary 
department of People’s publication, one of the 23 
subordinate departments of the People’s Daily (People.cn, 
2018). The collective name, commentary department of 
People publication, rather than the name of an individual 
is used to sign articles. Only official media or work-
units can give the correct meaning of Xi’s quotations 
in his speeches. Before giving an interpretation of Xi’s 
quotations, they would seek permission from the same 
level Party committee that issues them. (People, 2018 
and Zhihu, 2016) In other words, the party manipulates 
interpretation of Xi’s quotations in official central 
publication approved for issue in domestic China.
In comparison with Tthe Analects of Confucius and 
The Quotations of Chairman Mao, Xi’s works has at least 
two similarities. From a stylistic point of view, all three 
consist of quotations. Although the spreading dynamics 
of Classical Aphorisms by Xi Jinping is less than the 
other two Chinese famous quotation. Because of the 
information globalization of the internet period, Xi’s 
domestic discursive speeches could affect international 
influences. So as his speeches in international affairs. 
(Klimeš, 2018). Since the publication of Xi’s work in 
February 2015, it has been translated by official media 
into 14 versions in the United Kingdom, France, Russia, 
Japan and Portugal, with a total of nearly 2 million copies 
distributed. In May 2018, a second volume was published 
(CPC, 2018). To compare, the other two books also 
enjoyed the very large sales in worldwide, also exerted 
huge influences. (Tan et al, 2008) Xi’s work achieved such 
grand circulation because it was edited by the most crucial 
domestic official press., Quotations of Chairman Mao was 
the product of personality cult, and came from the inner 
material of the CCP (1967). Chairman Mao demonstrated 
his willness for a personality cult when, commenting on 
Lenin’s “dictatorship”, he cited Lenin’s words: ‘If you 
proclaimed my dictatorship, it means your willingness for 
dictatorship.’ (Inner party, 1967). Subsequently, the PLA 
newspaper was the first to come out with Quotations of 
Chairman Mao, which was given to troops (Xing, 2008). 
From then, the learning of Mao’s quotations spread 
nationally through the CCP’s propaganda efforts. Both 
Classical Aphorisms of Xi
Jinping and Quotations of Chairman Mao concern 
the topic of governing China, and the contents are derived 
from their writings or speeches.
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From the t ime Xi worked as a secretary of 
prefectural Party committees, he has continuedly focused 
on publishing his own experiences and discourses. 
These materials have become the learning material for 
CCP members today (Xi, 2018). It is evident that the 
series of articles and speeches published by Xi and Mao 
constructed their theory on the system of governance.
The analects of Confucius, is the root of historical 
Confucian doctrine. Yet it still contains many narratives 
of Confucius and his disciples and descriptions of his 
environment. The quotations include a reporting clause 
such as “Confucius said (子 曰)”, or “Zengzi said ( 
曾子曰)”. “The book The Analects of Confucius is a 
collection of what Confucius and some of his disciples 
said”. (Li, 1995) Most scholars believe that The Analects 
of Confucius represents the memory of Confucius’ 
students, and was compiled from their records into twenty 
Chapters. The real intention of The Analects’ editors was 
cherishing the memory of their teacher Confucius (Yang, 
1980 and Zou, 2010).
The motivation is totally different in Xi Jinping’s case. 
Some scholars collected and studied Xi’s quotations for 
propaganda use. Officials often support professional 
academic resources in the effort to exploit them for 
proper cultural governance and secure research funding 
(Perry, 2013 and William, 2015). For example, academic 
resources are focused on the theoretical establishment 
of Xi Jinping thought in domestic China by the 
Propaganda Department. But the essential purpose of both 
books is similar, since both attempt to highlight a political 
philosophy. This point appears clearly in the names of 
chapters.
However, in the twenty chapters of The Analects, no 
connection seems to exist between the chapters because 
their names were added under imperial China. Nan 
Huaijin (2012) argues that these statements were originally 
a whole article, but were cut in the editing process. 
Overseeing The Analects, every single chapter name is 
selected from the first quotation of this chapter. This 
point is agreed by some Chinese scholars. Li (2007) and 
Zou (2010) assert that the contents of The Analects are not 
coherent, and that the names of the chapters do not have 
substantive meaning. But these arguments are doubted by 
scholars who argue that the main theme of the Analects 
are benevolence (ren 仁) and the rites (li 礼). They see 
coherence in structure throughout the book. Since the 
temperament of readers can be cultivated, this book is 
half religion and half philosophy; people normally get to 
know Confucius through The Analects (Li, 1994, Zhang, 
2017 and Guo, 2018).
The commentaries of the famous Confucian Zhu 
Xi of the Song dynasty suggest that “the first chapter 
Xue er (studying) represents the foundational meaning; 
it is the door of accessing the morality, the most crucial 
responsibility for the students” (Zhu, 1992). The first 
chapter of The Analects narrates the importance of 
studying, which isthe foundation of become a good 
official. Other contents also recorded the skill and 
knowledge needed for governing the people (Zhang, 
2017). The “studying” style in the party is very popular. 
The main director of the commentary department of the 
People’s Daily, Yang Lixin (2018), stated that “president 
Xi continuously absorbs wisdom from Chinese classics 
to serve the people. We party member should follow the 
new tendency of the period and should also study Xi’s 
art of quoting Chinese classics.” For example, Xi quoted 
the famous Confucian scholar Xunzi in the opening 
ceremony for the Central Party School in 2013: “Scholars 
maybe not be officials, but officials do need to study.” 
(学者非必为士, 而仕者必为学) The current meaning of 
this sentence is that party officials should actively follow 
the orthodox line to protect the party’s reputation. (People.
cn, 2015) This tendency of the CCP utilizing has started 
to increase.
Although CCP members are forced to study Xi’s 
publications even as they appear  in new editions, the 
essence of this model relies on the fusion of authoritarian 
works of the past. The CCP has trained officials and 
members to follow Xi’s quotations. Not only is this a 
way to maintain their loyalty; it also implies the authority 
to use these Chinese classics to respond to current social 
issues such as social equality and justice, rule by law, and 
nationalism.
5. WHEN THE CHINESE CLASSICS 
CITATION ENCOUNTERS THE REAL 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS
Despite Xi’s frequent use of classical allusions to advance 
cultural government, some classical texts are vague 
and have varying interpretations. A single example will 
demonstrate that the Confucian classics can be interpreted 
diversely. “Ren (仁) as containing love, respect for 
others, dutifulness, loyalty, self-mastery, propriety 
and benevolence,” as the stated interpretation. As the 
interpreters engage in dialogue with the canonical texts, 
their personal values will be modified and changed. (Xie 
et al, 2017). According to Chinese official statistics, in 
January 2017, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) issued a “Guideline on carrying out 
the development project of inheriting and developing 
China’s splendid traditional culture”, which emphasized 
“to better integrate China’s splendid traditional culture 
into all aspects of production and life.” (Gov.cn, 2017). 
Chinese classical citations of Xi are collected by the 
mainstream media such as People’s Daily and Xinhua 
News Agency. Some part of their meaning is changed 
in Xi’s speeches. In general, when Xi quotes Chinese 
classics in relation to social problems, it delivers rhetorical 
value rather than substantive action. In official discourse, 
the cultural and China’s philosophical tradition are 
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originally dialectical. Now the propaganda of the CCP-
state attempts to lead public opinion with one voice. They 
strengthen argumentation patterns based on traditional 
Chinese notions of governance. At this stage, consolidated 
ideological governance over individual values, beliefs, 
and loyalties is the more important work for the CCP 
ideological department (Lam, 2015; Klimeš et al,  2018). 
For example, when Xi faced a focused question on 
income distribution, he cited The Analects of Confucius 
to give the public a commitment, “We should make the 
‘cake’ big, but also arrange it equally. ‘Do not worry 
about the equal distribution of wealth rather than the 
amounts of population; Do worry about the peaceful living 
of citizens rather than the poverty’ (不患寡而患不均, 
不患贫而患不安): this concept was rooted long ago in 
our society. We should improve social equality and justice 
and do whatever we can to gain new development in 
aspects of education, employment, healthcare, retirement 
pensions, and housing.” (Xi, 2014). “This concept was 
also the primary understanding of sharing in Chinese 
descendants’ thought” (Xi, 2015).
Th i s  pa s sage  f rom The  Ana lec t s  add re s se s 
equalitarianism and harmony, meaning the warlord should 
keep a balance with citizens’ property in order to maintain 
social stability. (Nan, 2012) In Xi’s adaptation, he cited 
this classic to echo the contents of his reports in 18th CPC 
national congress, “to implement that the achievements 
of development are shared by the people, we must delve 
reform of the income distribution system” (China Daily, 
2017). The CCP has successfully adapted this concept 
from a comment on equality to a concept of modern 
governance. The official interpretation of this has argued 
that “Xi Jinping citing this sentence perfectly expresses the 
requirement of common enrichments, the Chinese citizens’ 
common idea of thousands of years.” (People’s Daily 
commentary department, 2018) In the context of Xi’s 
speeches, this adaptation of a classical source seems not 
so vague; he hopes this sentence will inform citizens that 
even in a market economy, traditional values can guide the 
government in solving current livelihood issues.
This influence can also support top-level decision 
making. In Xi’s speeches, he has cited many Chinese 
classics to express “change” and “reform”. It is one 
rational alternative theory to describe some changes 
such as “the constitution and terms”. In 2018 at the 
13th National People’s Congress, an amendment to 
the constitution of the People’s Republic of China 
was approved. It deleted the limitation on presidential 
terms. (Sohu.com, 2018) The latest version of Classical 
Aphorisms of Xi Jinping recorded one classic quoted by Xi 
in CCP central Politburo 19th collective learning session 
about the amendment of the constitution: “If the law 
could change with the times, the country will get good 
governance; if the method of governing could coincide 
with the current society, the ruler will contribute to its 
achievements ( 法 与 时 转 则 治 ,  治 与 世 宜 则 有 功 ) 
(People’s Daily commentary department, 2018). This is 
only one classical sentence that has been connected with 
the change of constitution. It is a quote from the legalist 
philosopher Hanfeizi. The official interpretation claims 
that Xi’s citation referred to the national constitution. 
The national constitution should follow the times and 
evolve. The superstructure of the constitution should 
change according to the needs of the people. (People’s 
Daily commentary, 2018) But some western scholars 
such as James Mann and Francis Fukuyama fear that 
the increasing power of Xi Jinping will generate a “bad 
emperor” situation in China, because Xi could manipulate 
legislation such as a change of the constitution and 
reinforcement of media censorship. (James, 2007 and 
Fukuyama, 2018) Therefore, the positive interpretation by 
an official discourse has pointed that the available change 
of constitution. the quote in this speeches also implies that 
the CCP has followed an inherited right from the Spring 
and Autumn period, the ruler’s right to change laws.
Finally, Xi’s citing of Chinese classics in diplomatic 
contexts does not only influence international affairs. 
More importantly, Xi wants to encourage nationalism 
with China’s glories in a domestic narrative. They give 
China’s models to other countries, such as “One Belt, 
One Road” and “community of shared destiny”. When 
Xi visited Arab state league headquarters in 2016, he 
cited Mencius to express China’s decent image:” (The 
gentlemen) must establish the righteous position and 
walk the righteous way in the world.” (立天下之正位, 
行天下之大道) (People’s Daily commentary department, 
2018) In addition: “Instead of looking for a proxy in 
the Middle East, China promotes peace talks” (Gov.cn, 
2016). This sentence was originally a requirement to a 
gentlemen’s merit. Xi thus compared China to a decent 
gentleman whose effect is “righteous” in international 
affairs. Domestically, this sentence not only expressed a 
peaceful and positive image of China, but also implied 
the pursuit of order and power. Mencius’ theory of kingcraft 
(wang dao 王道) means that China could execute the 
kindness to others and maintain its merit as a leader. 
People.cn (2017) reported that in “the Chinese 5000 years 
history, CCP’s 95 development and 38 years of opening 
reform, all three achievements could have the capacity 
to announce that we are capable of being the facilitator 
of a new international order and international security.” 
From research of Chinese indigenous traditional values, 
Ye et al (2018) examined the people’s use of traditional 
proverbs in mainland China and found that the samples 
preferred phrases relating to diligence, integrity, and self-
preservation in daily life. Furthermore, the samples also 
concentrated more on the leadership and hierarchy 
values. Perhaps encouraging cultural nationalism with its 
traditional values in domestic China results in something 
easier to control. This perhaps stands in contrast to anti- 
Japanese sentiment in the past (BBC, 2017). Therefore, the 
government has used in propaganda China’s glories and 
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praised China’s rising position in international society. 
From this sort of quotation, China’s model and image 
are given new roots, to be found in traditional Confucian 
values of harmony and righteousness. Meanwhile, the 
government has attempted to avoid argument in the 
ideological sphere (King, et al, 2017).
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the different adaptions of 
Chinese classics in speeches by Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao 
and Xi Jinping. From the vagueness and lack of order 
in Jiang’s speeches to the Hu Jintao government’s use of 
some concepts of traditional Chinese culture to construct 
the political ideal of the “harmonious world”, now the 
Chinese classics are frequently used in Xi’s speeches 
and official propaganda work on the interpretation of 
Chinese classics is well established. Besides newspapers 
and internet propaganda, the CCP has also published 
collected works which record Xi’s adaption of Chinese 
classics to enhance his reputation. He has made himself 
a Confucian gentleman, an icon of traditional Chinese 
society for others to emulate. This paternalism is basic 
to Chinese traditional hierarchy and leadership value. Xi 
frequently emphasizes the morality required in Chinese 
classics for control over officials and government. 
Through comparison with works of Confucius and Mao; 
it was demonstrated that Xi’s canonical publications as 
continuously renewed utilize aspects of the past works. 
Xi’s works conflate Marxism with notions from the 
Chinese classics to solve real social issues. Finally, this 
study examined some current adaptions from traditional 
Chinese classics used to connect the reality of social 
equality and justice, rule by law and nationalism. These 
adaptions respond to focused issues, but represent the Xi 
Jinping governments’ commitment.
At present, Xi and the CCP have developed a rhetoric 
style in Xi’s speeches and official narrative. The CCP has 
evidently adapted Chinese culture as a new alternative 
for the foundation of its legitimacy. It is trying to transform 
its legitimacy to a root in adapted Chinese traditional 
values. But this sophisticated system fuses contradictory 
ideologies. On the one hand, the CCP has declared that 
it should insist on the banner of Marxism, but elements 
originally foreign to Marxism have been included; this 
model has less attraction in China. On the other hand, 
the CCP has announced that it is the loyal protector of 
traditional Chinese culture, but fails to admit its own past 
destruction of Chinese traditions.
In the future, the CCP will continuous to think about 
how to fulfill its commitment to Chinese people with such 
ideas as the “Chinese dream”. Then, in the transformation 
of the process of legitimacy, Xi will keep balancing the 
needs of the New left climate. After all, the public still 
responds better to economic and political reforms rather 
than to a demonstration of classical Chinese knowledge.
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